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y la selección de prestatarios: un experimento
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David Sander. University of Geneva 
ABSTRACT A major characteristic of credit markets is information asymmetry. To combat its problems, 
as credit rationing, principals can use a menu of contracts to screen clients with different risk level. 
We conduct a laboratory experiment to address an important question for such settings —does the 
framing of the offered menu of contracts interfere with the self-selection mechanism? The answer is 
yes. We fi nd subjects' choices shift when the same (positive) outcomes of the same menu of contracts 
are presented in two different frames. Subjects exhibit loss aversion in their perception of the positive 
outcomes below the reference point, and self-selection fails to occur.
KEYWORDS Behavioral fi nance; Credit screening; Framing; Loss aversion; Reference point; Self-se-
lection.
RESUMEN Uno de los mayores problemas actuales es el racionamiento del crédito, derivado funda-
mentalmente de las asimetrías informativas. Para disminuir las asimetrías informativas, los bancos 
pueden aplicar «screening». Esto es, pueden ofrecer a sus clientes un menú de contratos y, dependien-
do de la elección de éstos, inferir su nivel de riesgo. Si las elecciones de los clientes de alto riesgo y de 
bajo riesgo difi eren entre sí, hay autoselección de clientes y, por tanto, «screening». En este artículo 
presentamos un experimento que examina una cuestión esencial en estos contextos —¿Interfi ere el 
punto de referencia de los clientes en su autoselección?— La respuesta es sí. De hecho, las elecciones 
cambian cuando los mismos datos (positivos) de los mismos contratos se presentan con una referen-
cia diferente. Por ello, proponemos una aproximación teórica derivada de la «Prospect Theory» para 
explicar nuestros resultados. Observamos una aversión a las pérdidas percibidas que hace fracasar 
la autoselección.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A large number of experimental studies, within economics and psychology, 
support that individuals decision-making differ depending on the reference they 
are given (1). The Reference-Dependent approaches [see Thaler (1980)], and most 
prominently the Prospect Theory [Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992)] have gained widespread success in economics and decision 
research. In contrast with more conventional economic approaches, in which the 
possible outcomes of available choice options are valued in absolute terms, as the 
Expected Utility Theory, Reference-Dependent theories are based on the idea that 
outcomes are always evaluated relative to some relevant reference point.
In this paper, we present an experiment designed to study the reference effect 
on a question of major importance in fi nancial markets: credit screening. A key 
characteristic of credit —and insurance— markets is information asymmetry. 
To combat its problems of adverse selection, moral hazard and credit rationing, 
banks and insurance companies can use screening. That is, they can offer the 
clients a menu of contracts and infer their characteristics from their choices. If 
the pattern of choices that individuals with different characteristics, as risk level, 
make when facing a menu of contracts differs, then there is self-selection of clients 
and screening occurs. The possibility of screening borrowers by their risk level 
is of great importance. When lenders offer a menu of contracts inducing the self-
selection of fi rms, there is a separating equilibrium that reveals information and 
can resolve credit rationing. In addition, monetary policies by Central Banks 
improve its effectiveness.
Among the extant screening mechanisms, lenders may employ collateral 
requirements along with the interest rate (2). Bester (1985) shows that applicants 
with lower-risk projects are willing to accept higher collateral at a lower 
premium, while those with higher-risk projects select unsecured loans at a higher 
premium.
Our experiment aims to answer an essential question for such settings: Does the 
framing of the offered menu of contracts interfere with the self-selection of clients? 
The answer is yes. In fact, subjects' choices shift when the same (positive) outcomes 
of the same menu of contracts are presented in two different frames. Since both 
frames differ only in the «perceived» reference point, we propose a theoretical 
approach that initially follows Prospect Theory to explain our results.
An essential feature of Prospect Theory and other Reference-Dependent approaches 
is the behavioral assumption that postulates that individuals overvalue what is lost 
from their reference viewpoint (loss aversion). If individuals perceive the collateral 
(1) The empirical/experimental literature on Reference-Dependent individual decision-making is too large to be cited here. 
See Camerer (1995) and Sugden (1999) for insightful surveys.
(2) See Bester (1985), Chan and Kanatas (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Chan and Thakor (1987), Deshons and 
Freixas (1987), Igawa and Kanatas (1990), Stiglitz and Weiss (1992).
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contract terms as a possible loss, it may imply that individuals value the collateral 
more than Bester's theory predicts. As a result, applicants with lower-risk projects 
may not be willing to accept higher collateral at a lower premium to self-select, 
and the screening mechanism may fail.
Our results show that subjects exhibit loss aversion in their perception and 
assessment of the positive outcomes under the reference point, and self-selection 
fails to occur. To the best of our knowledge, this is the fi rst paper that applies a 
Reference-Dependent approach to self-selection mechanisms.
A few experimental papers have examined screening, but have focused on the 
principal's behavior not in the self-selection mechanism [Shapira and Venezia 
(1999), Posey and Yavas (2007), and Kübler et al. (2008) have studied screening 
in the insurance and the labor markets]. Only Capra et al. (2009) have focused on 
the self-selection mechanism and have studied the effects of moral hazard on self-
selection. Our experiment studies framing effects in the self-selection mechanism 
needed in credit screening.
In the next section, the game theoretic prediction and hypotheses are presented. 
In section 3, the experimental design and procedures are described. Section 4 
presents the results from the experiment and the fi nal section summarizes the 
main conclusions.
2. GAME-THEORETIC PREDICTION AND HYPOTHESES
Our theoretical framework revolves around a principal-agent game that initially 
follows Bester's (1985) model on credit screening. In this setting, we introduce a 
Reference-Dependent Expected Utility approach that allows for loss aversion in the 
perception and assessment of collateral.
We consider a market with two types of agents n = r (riskier), s (safer), according to 
their project risk level. Each agent has the possibility of starting an annual project 
that requires an initial fi xed investment I (3). The return on the project for agent 
n is given by the random variable R
~
n, with 0 < R
~
n < R
–
n and a distribution function 
Fn(R) > 0 for all R > 0. The agents have an initial wealth W < I, which together with 
a loan B = I – W fi nance the project. Given the size of the loan B, and the interest 
rate i, a credit contract γ = (P, D) is specifi ed by the Price, P = (1 + i) B, and the 
collateral (Deposit), D. If agent n's project fails, agent loses the collateral. Thus, 
following Expected Utility Theory as Bester's (1985) model, the expected profi t of 
the project for agent n and a credit contract γ is given by:
Πn (γ) = E {max [R
~
n – P, – D]} (1)
(3) Given that the required investment is ﬁ xed, it is not used as a way to signal information about the agent's risk. See 
Milde and Riley (1988) for models in which the investment is used as a signal.
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Banks cannot distinguish borrowers by risk; however, they can separate them by 
offering a pair of contracts (γr, γs) that are incentive compatible and act as self-
selecting mechanisms. The pair (γr, γs) is incentive compatible if:
Πr (γr) ≥ Πr (γs);  Πs (γs) ≥ Πs (γr) (2)
As long as a pair of contracts (γr, γs) is offered, the agent prefers the contract 
that maximizes its expected profi ts. Thus, if preferences of investors depend 
systematically on their types, banks can utilize a menu of contracts with different 
collateral requirements as self-selection mechanisms. The low risk loan applicants 
try to differentiate themselves from high risk applicants by accepting higher 
collateral for a given reduction in interest rates. The isoprofi t curves for the 
two types of loan applicants are depicted in fi gure 1. Applicant r isoprofi t curve 
has a steeper slope than applicant s, because the former's project is riskier and, 
by stochastic dominance of second degree, profi ts are a convex function of the 
realized returns (R). This means that type s agents are inclined to accept a higher 
increment in collateral for a given reduction in interest rates than type r agents. 
This fact allows self-selection of agent's types when the principal (bank) offers 
different pairs of incentive-compatible contracts(4).
FIGURE 1
AGENTS' ISOPROFIT CURVES
Collateral
interest rate
Dr Ds
i
s
r
However, under Prospect Theory and other Reference-Dependent models, 
individuals overvalue what is lost from their reference viewpoint. These behavioral 
approaches are at odds with traditional economic models, as Bester's, according to 
which the reference point should not affect valuations of the collateral.
In this paper, we aim to study if the reference effect interferes with the self-selection 
of clients. Thus, based on the incentive compatible contracts à la Bester (1985) we 
(4) In Bester (1985), self-selection resulted from stronger assumptions than in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). To produce a 
separating equilibrium the additional assumption that Fi(R) > 0 for all R > 0 is needed. With this assumption, it is possible to 
have a monotonous relationship between risk and applicants' preferences.
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design an experiment (described in section 3) where the subject's expected payoffs, 
according to the expected profi t of the project (equation [1]), are given by:
EPayoff [Πn (γj)] = q (W + R
~
n – Pj) + (1 – q) (W + 0 – Dj) ∀ j=1,…, J (3)
Where q is the probability of the project's success, and J is the number of credit 
contracts γj = (Pj, Dj).
In this setting, a Reference-Dependent Expected Utility approach that allows for loss 
aversion in the perception and assessment of collateral is used. This specifi cation 
is typically used for cumulative Prospect Theory [Tversky and Kahneman (1992)] 
without its characteristic probability weighting functions, removed for simplicity.
Under this Reference-Dependent Expected Utility model, the value function V of 
the subject's payoffs is defi ned by:
 (X
~
j – W)α if X
~
j ≥ W
V (W, X
~
j) = { –λ (W – X~j)α if X~j < W (4)
Where X
~
j = [W + R
~
n – Pj, W + 0 – Dj] is the outcome of each contract γj = (Pj, Dj) for 
each type of agent n, α is the parameter indicating the curvature of the value 
function, and λ is the loss aversion parameter (normally above 1).
According to this Reference-Dependent value (RDV), equation [3] can be re-defi ned 
as:
RDV(q) = qV [W, X
~
j (R
~
n Pj)] + (1 – q)V [W, Xj (Dj)] (5)
This Reference-Dependent approach allows for the loss aversion behavior 
documented in the theoretical literature and can help explain the mixed results 
obtained by the empirical literature on the relationship between collateral and 
borrower risk(5).
Following this Reference-Dependent approach, in this paper we design an experi-
ment to test agents' self-selection under two different frames (both positive).
By designing ad hoc incentive compatible contracts à la Bester (1985), we test the 
following hypotheses:
H1:  Contracts combining pairs of collateral and price screen agents with different 
risk levels.
H2:  Framing (reference) affects the valuation of collateral and interferes with the 
screening mechanism.
(5) Berger and Udell (1998) offer a comprehensive review of this literature. Some papers show that secured lending is 
associated with risky borrowers [i.e. Orgler (1970), Hester (1979), Scott and Smith (1986), Leeth and Scott (1989), Berger 
and Udell (1990, 1992), Booth (1992), Reig and Ramírez-Comeig (1998), Jimenez and Saurina (2004)], and others ﬁ nd the 
opposite relationship [Cressy (1996), Machauer and Weber (1998), Burke and Hanley (2006), Comeig et al. (2013)].
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
An environment was designed in which there were N subjects that needed money 
to develop a project with some expected future return. Each subject had the two 
types of projects n = r (riskier: 50% prob. success), s (safer: 90% prob. success). 
They played 10 rounds with the safer project and 10 rounds with the riskier 
project in each treatment. We offered a menu of two contracts each round. Each 
contract included two features: the price to be paid and a deposit, representing the 
collateral.
We run two treatments, Framing 1 (F1) and Framing 2 (F2), one with broken 
down payments. There is only one difference between the two treatments: The 
payoffs' framing (See fi gures 2 and 3). Framing 1 (fi gure 2) shows, in this example, 
a payoff of 725 units for contract A when the project succeeds, whereas Framing 
2 (fi gure 3) shows a payoff of 300 + 425 (that equals 725). Similarly, Framing 1 
(fi gure 2) shows a payoff of 75 units for contract A when the project fails, whereas 
Framing 2 (fi gure 3) shows a payoff of 300-225 (that equals 75). Both treatments 
had the same instructions (6).
FIGURE 2
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: FRAMING 1
Deposit
Price
CONTRACT A 
175
225
  
 
CONTRACT B 
285
75
 
 
A B
OUTCOMES
 
 
Success (90%)
Failure (10%)
NONE
(330 tokens)
615 tokens
225 tokens
725 tokens
75 tokens
(6) The instructions and other documents used in this experiment are available upon request.
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FIGURE 3
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: FRAMING 2
Deposit
Price
CONTRACT A 
175
225
  
 
CONTRACT B 
285
75
 
 
A B
OUTCOMES
 
 
Success (90%)
Failure (10%)
NONE
(330 tokens)
300 + 315 tokens
300 - 75 tokens
300 + 425 tokens
300 - 225 tokens
In this experimental market, each individual started each round with an initial 
wealth of 300 units. Each subject had to choose one or none of the two offered 
contracts in each round. The subjects who did not choose any contract in the round 
received a return of thirty monetary units. Under Expected Utility, as in Bester's 
(1985) model, the individuals expected payoffs were:
EPayoff (Πs) = 0.9 (300 + 600 – Pj) + 0.1 (300 + 0 – Dj) (6)
EPayoff (Πr) = 0.5 (300 + 1,080 – Pj) + 0.5 (300 + 0 – Dj) (7)
In each of the rounds, we offered a pair of theoretically incentive compatible contracts 
(γr, γs), with: Πr(γr) > Πr(γs) and Πs(γs) > Πs(γr). Table 1 shows the fi ve pairs of contracts 
offered to the subjects and Figure 4 illustrates the iso-profi t curves designed with 
the fi ve pairs of offered contracts. The pairs of theoretically incentive-compatible 
contracts applied here are the ones used originally by Capra et al. (2009). In Capra 
et al. (2009) these pairs of contracts —shown without broken down payments in a 
between subjects experiment— screen borrowers characterized by different risk-
levels. Unlike Capra et al. (2009), in our experiment, each pair of contracts was 
shown in two different rounds, in order to counterbalance the side (left, right) 
and colors (blue and yellow) of the contracts in each pair. The experiment was 
programmed and run in E-prime for these graphical reasons.
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TABLE 1
PAIRS OF OFFERED CONTRACTS
Pair
Contract r Contract s 
Price
(Pj)
Deposit
(Dj)
Price
(Pj)
Deposit
(Dj)
1 360 0 166 300
2 335 25 169 275
3 310 50 172 250
4 285 75 175 225
5 260 100 177 200
FIGURE 4
DESIGNED CONTRACTS' ISOPROFIT CURVES
Expected Return = 660
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Security Deposit
Pr
ic
e
Safer Project Riskier Project
We chose a within subjects design in order to control for individual differences in 
personality or risk attitude (we avoid the possibility of having one group of subjects 
playing one treatment, and other different group playing the other treatment). Half 
of the subjects played Framing 2 fi rst, to control for order effects.
Thus, the design of the experiment controls for the order of treatments, the 
presentation (right/left; blue/yellow colors), and allows for indifference: We ask two 
times the same choice (an indifferent participant may choose contract one once, 
and contract two once).
The forty-seven subjects of the experiment were students from the University 
of Geneva (Switzerland) recruited from various courses and grades using fl yers 
(twenty-three males, twenty-four females). During the experiment, they were not 
allowed to communicate with the rest of the participants. The individuals read 
the instructions and we answered their questions. During the game the subjects 
received no feedback. At the end of the experiment, they received their earnings 
(the average payment was 17 CHF) (7). Each session lasted for one hour and 15 
minutes and was run either at the laboratory of the Swiss Center for Affective 
Sciences or at the laboratory of the Faculty of Psychology, both at the University of 
Geneva.
(7) Subjects were paid four rounds drawn at random: one from the low risk and one from the high risk project in treatment 
F1 and one from the low risk and one from the high risk project in treatment F2.
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4. RESULTS
The results of the experiment are summarized in table 2 and fi gure 5. There are a 
total of 470 observations per treatment. Framing 1 differs from Framing 2 only in 
the presentation of outcomes.
In Framing 1, as predicted by Bester's model, subjects with riskier project mostly 
choose the low collateral contract (58.94%). The Wilcoxon test shows that the 
difference between low collateral and high collateral contract choices is signifi cant 
at 1% level (p=0.01). By contrast, when the same subjects have the safer project, 
they prefer (55.32%) the contract with the higher collateral (p=0.08). Our results 
confi rm that Framing 1 allows the subjects to self-select and, therefore, screening 
occurs(8). H1 is confi rmed in Framing 1.
In Framing 2, the percentage of choices of the low collateral contract rises in 
both projects, and screening fails to occur (71.91% choices for riskier projects, 
and 44.89% choices for safer projects —although the increase in choices for safer 
projects is not statistically signifi cant, p=0.20). This result supports H2. Subjects 
perceiving they may «lose» the initial wealth (remember Figure 3; subjects see, 
for example: 300+425, 300-225), avoid high collateral contract choices. Table 2 
shows that, in Framing 2, there is no self-selection. When subjects have the safer 
project, the difference between low collateral contract choices (44.89%) and high 
collateral contract choices (49.36%) is not signifi cant (p=0.71). The presence of a 
default option did not signifi cantly affect decisions.
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE AND TEST STATISTICS BY TREATMENT AND PROJECT
Framing 1 Framing 2
Riskier Project Safer Project Riskier Project Safer Project
Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
Lowcoll (LC) 277 58.94% 183 38.94% 338 71.91% 211 44.89%
Highcoll (HC) 151 32.13% 260 55.32% 96 20.43% 232 49.36%
None (NC) 42 8.94% 27 5.74% 36 7.66% 27 5.74%
Wilcoxon Test Riskier Project Safer Project
Framing 1 Framing 2 Framing 1 Framing 2
Lowcoll-Highcoll p = 0.01 p = 0.00 p = 0.08 p = 0.71
Lowcoll-None p = 0.00 p = 0.00 p = 0.00 p = 0.00
Highcoll-None p = 0.00 p = 0.03 p = 0.00 p = 0.00
Lowcoll p = 0.01 p = 0.20
Highcoll p = 0.01 p = 0.32
None P = 0.43 P = 0.62
(8) Capra et al. (2009) also present the outcomes in absolute values and ﬁ nd screening.
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Figure 5 shows the histograms of these results by framing and project type. Most 
of the subjects with the safer project choose, in the Framing 1, the high collateral 
contract, whereas in Framing 2, the same subjects modify their choices and reduce 
their choices of high collateral contract. Therefore, Framing 2 interferes with self-
selection and screening fails to occur.
FIGURE 5
HISTOGRAM BY FRAMING AND PROJECT
58.94
32.13
8.94
38.94
55.32
5.74
71.91
20.43
7.66
44.89
49.36
5.74
0
20
40
60
80
Riskier Project Safer Project Riskier Project Safer Project
LC HC NC LC HC NC LC HC NC LC HC NC
Framing 1 Framing 2
pe
rc
en
t
We run a (panel) logistic model to confi rm that self-selection is infl uenced by 
framing, as descriptive statistics show. Table 3 displays the results of the logistic 
analysis.
As expected, in both frames, the probability of choosing the low collateral contract 
increases when subjects have a riskier project (F1*Risker and F2*Risker variables). 
On the other hand, when subjects have the safer project, they prefer the high 
collateral contract in Framing 1 (see the negative sign in F1*Safer). However, 
having the safer project in Framing 2 does not play any signifi cant role in subjects' 
choices (F2*Safer).
The results clearly support H1 (Contracts combining pairs of collateral and price 
screen agents with different risk levels) for Framing 1. Nevertheless, by presenting 
the outcomes in a slightly different way in Framing 2, the results confi rm H2 
(Framing, reference, affects the valuation of collateral and interfere the screening 
mechanism).
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TABLE 3
LOGIT MODEL
Prob. of Low Collateral dy/dx Std. Errors
F1*Safer -0.09 0.05***
F2*Safer -0.01 0.04***
F1*Risker  0.18 0.03***
F2*Risker  0.32 0.02***
 Number of obs. = 1748 Wald χ2 = 166.82
 Number of groups = 47 Prob. > χ2 = 0.00
 Obs per group: min = 22
Marginal effects after Random-effects logit regression. *, ** and *** signiﬁ cant at 10%, 5% and 1% conﬁ dence level respectively. 
Given that Framing 1 and Framing 2 differ only in terms of the «perceived» initial 
position, it seems natural to use a Reference-Dependent approach to explain our 
results.
We use our experimental data to estimate the Reference-Dependent parameters of 
the model presented in section 2. We estimate maximum likelihood of value function 
using a structural model of binary choice, following Harrison and Rutström (2008). 
In particular, equations [4] and [5] in our model are defi ned by:
W = 300; the initial wealth.
Xjs = [300 + 600 – Pj, 300 + 0 – Dj]
Xjr = [300 + 1,080 – Pj, 300 + 0 – Dj]
(8)
We estimate the model using the clustering method that allows for within-subjects 
choices' correlation. Table 4 shows the estimated parameters and fi gure 6 depicts 
the resulted functions. The estimated α parameter, α = 0.26, shows risk aversion. 
Interestingly, the estimated α does not differ signifi cantly between Framing 1 and 
Framing 2 (p-value = 0.95). As expected, above the initial wealth (300), subjects' 
choices are similar for Framing 1 and 2 (see fi gure 6).
However, bellow the «perceived» reference point of 300, the same subjects facing 
the same menus of contracts make different decisions in Framing 1 and Framing 
2. Remember that Framing 1 differs from Framing 2 only in the presentation 
of outcomes (9) (see fi gures 2 and 3). The estimated λ parameter is signifi cantly 
different in Framing 1 and 2, p-value = 0.03. In Framing 2, the λ > 1 shows loss 
aversion. Subjects perceive the outcomes below 300 (for example, 300-225 in 
fi gure 3) as a loss, and loss aversion is elicited. No loss aversion is elicited by 
Framing 1, λ < 1, were the outcomes are shown in absolute values (for example, 
75 in fi gure 2).
(9) Both Framings even share exactly the same instructions.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED REFERENCE-DEPENDENT PARAMETERS
Framing 1 Framing 2
Coefﬁ cient Std. Errors Coefﬁ cient Std. Errors
α 0.26 0.04*** 0.26 0.03***
λ 0.61 0.22*** 1.28 0.29***
Number of obs. = 871 Number of obs. = 877
H0: αF1 = αF2 p-value = 0.95
H0: λF1 = λF2 p-value = 0.03
Standard Errors adjusted for 47 clusters in subject. *** signiﬁ cant at 1% conﬁ dence level. 
An essential feature of Prospect Theory is that the carriers of value are gains 
and losses rather than the fi nal outcome (i.e. gains and perceived losses, in our 
experiment). Loss aversion is the behavioral assumption that postulates that 
individuals, from their reference viewpoint, value losses more than gains. This 
implies, as shown in fi gure 6, that the perception of a potential loss generated 
by the collateral contract terms makes subjects overweight this component of the 
contract. In Framing 2 subjects perceive that they are already enjoying a good (the 
FIGURE 6
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initial wealth), and realize that with some probability they can lose this existing 
good (collateral) (10). Loss aversion interferes with the self-selection of subjects in 
Framing 2, and the screening mechanism fails.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Inspired by the Reference-Dependent approaches, and most prominently by the 
seminal works of Kahnemann and Tversky and their Prospect Theory, we have 
conducted an experiment to study framing effects in the self-selection mechanism 
needed in the classic problem of credit screening, a problem with important 
economic and policy implications: Screening borrowers by their risk level may help 
solve credit rationing.
Extant theories on credit screening assume that borrowers' preferences among 
different combinations of interest and collateral systematically depend on their 
risk levels. However, these models so far, have not addressed an important question 
for such settings: Does the framing (reference) of the offered menu of contracts 
interfere with the self-selection of clients? We have found that framing does affect 
the valuation of collateral and interferes with the screening mechanism. In fact, 
subjects' choices shift when the same (positive) outcomes of the same menu of 
contracts are presented in two different frames.
Since both frames differ only in the perceived reference point, we use a Reference-
Dependent approach that initially follows Prospect Theory to explain our results. 
This approach takes explicitly into account that individuals, from their reference 
viewpoint, value losses more than gains. In fact, our results show that the «loss 
perception» generated by the collateral contract terms makes subjects overvalue 
this contract component. Subjects exhibit loss aversion in their perception and 
assessment of the collateral —although framed as a positive outcome under the 
reference point—, and self-selection fails to occur.
Our result emphasizes the need to account for the frames of reference under which 
evaluations of probabilistic information take place. In general, principal-agent 
games and the theoretical models on fi nancial markets should take into account 
the reference points (and the related concept of endowment effect).
This fi nding can be used to explain the mixed empirical results reported in the 
literature on the relationship between collateral and borrower risk. Some papers 
show that secured lending is associated with risky borrowers [i.e. Orgler (1970), 
Hester (1979), Scott and Smith (1986), Leeth and Scott (1989), Berger and Udell 
(1990, 1992), Booth (1992), Reig and Ramírez-Comeig (1998), Jimenez and Saurina 
(2004)], while others fi nd the opposite relationship [Cressy (1996), Machauer and 
Weber (1998), Burke and Hanley (2006), Comeig et al. (2013)]. Banks —and more 
(10) In the same line, Georgantzís and Navarro-Martínez (2011), in their paper on psychological processes behind the 
endowment effect, ﬁ nd that two different phases contribute to the endowment effect: (1) a ﬁ rst phase of enhancement of 
subject's positive feelings produced by ownership and (2) a second phase of aversion to possible loss.
O C S C S S
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generally principals— should consider framing and the agents' reference point 
when offering a menu of alternatives.
By changing the collateral term of the contract by a co-payment term, our model 
and results are applicable to other important fi nancial sectors, as insurance. 
Insurance companies should also consider framing and the agents' reference point 
when offering a menu of alternatives to screen clients of different risk levels.
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